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I argue for a manipulationist-mechanistic 
framework for content-NCC research in the case of visual 
consciousness (Bechtel 2008; Neisser 2012). Reference to 
mechanisms is common in the NCC research. Furthermore, 
recent developments in non-invasive brain stimulation 
techniques (NIBS) lend support to a manipulationist 
standpoint. The crucial question is to understand what is 
changed after manipulation of a brain mechanism. In the 
second part of the paper I review the literature on 
intentionalism, and argue that intervention on the neural 
mechanism is likely to change the intentional content of 
consciousness. This urges us to shift from content-NCC to 
what I call “intentional mechanisms”. Such mechanisms, it 
is argued, should be understood as neural prerequisites of 
conscious visual experience.  
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Introduction 
In the last years, we have witnessed a spurt of progress in 
the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). 
The growing scientific literature seems to suggest that, in 
the next years, non-invasive brain stimulation techniques 
(NIBS) will play an important role in NCC research (e.g. de 
Graaf & Sack 2014).  
 In this paper I focus on the search for content-NCC, i.e. 
the neural correlates of a specific conscious experience, the 
content of consciousness. Specifically, I narrow down my 
attention to NCCs of the visual contents of consciousness. 
This set of experiences embraces, for example, seeing 
something red, seeing an object, and so on.  
Following the suggestion of Neisser (2012), I argue that 
NIBS urges us to rethink Chalmers’s received view on 
content-NCC. However, in contrast with Neisser who 
suggests adopting Craver’s (2007) account of explanation in 
neuroscience, I put forward Bechtel’s (2008) account of 
mental mechanisms.   
In the first section I outline the new frontier of NCC 
research through NIBS. In the second section I show how 
the received view should be changed, moving toward a 
manipulationist-mechanistic approach. This raises the 
challenge of understanding what is actually changed 
through manipulation of the neural machinery. I finally 
argue that what is changed is the intentional content of 
consciousness. Research on content-NCC does not target 
consciousness. The mechanisms behind the contents of 
visual consciousness should be understood as neural 
prerequisite of conscious vision. I call such systems 
“intentional mechanisms”. In the final section, I briefly 
draw attention to some implications for future researches. 
NIBS and NCC research 
In his account of explanation in neuroscience, Craver 
(2007) observes that neuroscience is mainly driven by two 
goals. The first goal is explanation. Under this goal we 
group researches about how the brain develops from infancy 
to adulthood, how memory is realized by the brain, and so 
on. The second goal is to control the brain. Under this goal 
we find the attempt to diagnose and treat neural diseases, for 
example.  
These two goals are also visible in neuroscience’s search 
for NCCs. One goal is to explain consciousness, whilst the 
other is to manipulate and control brain mechanisms that 
implement our conscious experience. Intervention on the 
NCCs might prove helpful not only for diagnostic purposes, 
but also in locating them (e.g. Koubeissi et al. 2014; Parivizi 
et al. 2012). Furthermore, manipulating brain mechanisms 
somehow related to conscious experience can help us 
moving from a mere correlation to causation (Koch 2004: 
100), thus helping us explaining consciousness. Finally, in a 
recent review paper, de Graaf & Sack (2014) highlight the 
role of NIBS techniques in disentangling neural 
prerequisite, substrates, and consequences of conscious 
experience (e.g. Aru et al. 2012; de Graaf et al. 2012).  
Among NIBS techniques we find transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), and transcranial electric stimulation 
(TES), which includes transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) as well as transcranial alternating current 
stimulation (tACS). In the search for NCCs, NIBS does not 
represent an alternative, but a valuable complement to 
refined neuroimaging techniques (e.g. Friston 2011). The 
reason is simple: whilst a regional BOLD response in fMRI 
cannot tell us whether the neural processing is «imperative 
for the task at hand» (de Graaf & Sack 2014: 6), 
manipulating a specific brain mechanism thanks to NIBS 
might change the corresponding conscious percept. If 
manipulation of a mechanism disrupts or elicits a conscious 
percept, than we have good reasons to infer that such a 
mechanism has some functional role for consciousness. 
 The use of NIBS techniques in NCC research is 
flourishing. A TMS pulse on the occipital lobe can, for 
example, generate a phosphene (e.g. Kammer 1999). 
Application of TMS pulse on the motion area MT/V5 
(Fellman & Van Essen 1991) elicits moving phosphenes (de 
Graaf & Sack 2014: 6). Another example of application of 
TMS is the induction of virtual lesions in the parietal cortex 
in cases of experiments in bistable vision (e.g. Carmel et al. 
2010). 
Such experiments suggest that, in the next years, 
manipulation of brain mechanisms will be a valuable tool in 
finding out the NCCs. In addition, I believe that they 
suggest us to revise the current paradigm of content-NCC 
research and to carefully rethink our understanding of the 
NCC problem.  
Steps Towards a New Paradigm for NCC 
Research 
The Standard NCC approach 
The standard definition of content-NCC has been put 
forward by Chalmers: 
 
An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational 
system N such that representation of a content in N is 
sufficient, under conditions C, for representation of that 
content in consciousness. (Chalmers 2000: 31) 
 
There are three features I would like to highlight in this 
study. First, between the neural system N and conscious 
experience there is only a correlative relation. In this sense, 
the correlation is better understood as a statistically 
significant co-occurrence of a given conscious content and 
activation of the putative content-NCC. The correlation is 
meant to capture a “metaphysically” neutral stance on the 
issue that sidesteps the causal problem (Neisser 2012).  
The second feature is that the conscious experience at 
stake is a specific conscious state, what we in the 
philosophical jargon call a specific “content of 
consciousness” (e.g. Siegel 2010).  
Finally, the neural system N is constrained through the 
condition of minimal sufficiency. Chalmers (2000: 24-25) 
argues that this requirement is introduced in order to screen 
off redundant neural activity. If one takes a content-NCC to 
be a merely sufficient neural system, then the whole brain 
would count as NCC. But obviously, what we are looking 
for is a much more specific brain system that appears to be 
directly involved in conscious experience.  
Mechanisms and Manipulation 
Neisser (2012) points out that the supposedly neutral 
connection between N and a specific conscious content does 
not capture the scientific understanding of the issue. 
Furthermore, he argues that the requirement of minimal 
sufficiency is a logical condition that betrays a commitment 
with a classical paradigm of explanation: the search for 
covering laws, well represented by the deductive-
nomological (DN) model of explanation (Hempel & 
Oppenheim 1948). 
In contrast with this paradigm, Neisser puts forward an 
alternative framework: the manipulationist-mechanistic 
model of explanation articulated by Carl Craver (2007). 
However, the search for the visual content-NCC is better 
described as the search for mental mechanisms (Bechtel 
2008). Since “mechanisms” and “manipulation” are key 
concepts for the present analysis, we must first briefly dwell 
on their definitions.  
 
Mechanisms. Bechtel defines a mechanism as:   
 
…a structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their 
organization. The orchestrated functioning of the 
mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomenon 
(Bechtel 2008: 13). 
 
The growing body of literature on mechanistic 
explanation often draws attention to the ubiquitous 
reference to mechanisms in psychology and the life sciences 
(Bechtel 2008; Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Darden 2006), 
and specifically in neuroscience (Craver 2007). Although 
very few philosophers have paid attention to this 
(exceptions are Hohwy 2009, Neisser 2012), reference to 
mechanisms is also ubiquitous in research on the NCCs. 
Consider only few examples: “Still wanted – the 
mechanisms of consciousness” (Aru & Bachmann 2015);  
«These [the NCC] are the smallest set of brain mechanisms 
[…] sufficient for some conscious feeling […]» (Koch 
2004: xv-xvi). Commenting on the problem of emergence, 
Francis Crick also seemed to suggest a mechanistic strategy 
in NCC research: «while the whole may not be the simple 
sum of the separate parts, its behavior can, at least in 
principle, be understood from the nature and behavior of its 
parts plus the knowledge of how all these parts interact» 
(1994: 11). Here we observe a typical mechanistic 
explanatory strategy: mechanistic decomposition (Bechtel & 
Richardson 1993; Kauffman 1971).  
Mechanistic decomposition is a key step toward a 
mechanistic explanation. In contrast with the DN model, 
mechanistic explanation does not rely on covering laws, but 
explains a phenomenon by showing how entities and 
activities produce the explanandum (Bechtel & Abrahamsen 
2005; Craver 2005). In short: a mechanistic explanation 
explains why a phenomenon occurred by exposing how it 
occurs.    
 
Manipulation. The other key concept is that of 
manipulation. I think that Neisser’s suggestion can receive 
substantial support precisely thanks to the recent 
developments in NIBS techniques that I outlined in the first 
section. 
Relying on Woodward (2003), Craver defines X as 
causally relevant to Y iff there is: 
 
…an ideal intervention on X that changes the value of Y, 
or the probability distribution over the values of Y (Craver 
2007: 198).  
 
Conceptualizing the search for content-NCC according to 
the manipulationist (or “interventionist”) view means to 
intervene on the putative brain mechanism related to 
conscious content and observe the elicited change in visual 
phenomenology. In an experimental setting, this might 
involve screening off interfering factors that affects X in 
normal conditions (Campbell 2007 calls it “surgical” 
intervention).  
It should be stressed that whilst manipulation can help us 
sorting out different kinds of neural activity, its role within a 
mechanistic explanation is that of localizing operations 
within specific mechanistic parts (Bechtel & Richardson 
1993). This is likely to put additional constraints on the 
model, unveiling the mechanism’s structure. However, 
localization also requires understanding of what operations 
are carried out by the different functions. This suggests that 
localization is but only one step towards a mechanistic 
explanation (Bechtel 2008). 
Still, the manipulationist-mechanistic framework 
represents a promising conceptualization of the NCC 
problem. However, intervening on the brain mechanisms of 
the contents of consciousness demands to properly define 
the changed, altered, phenomenon. Understanding the 
function of such mechanism is of paramount importance in 
constructing a mechanistic explanation. Mechanisms are for 
a specific function (Glennan 1996). Circumscribing the 
function of the mechanisms of the contents of consciousness 
means to tackle the issue of what they actually do, which in 
turn enable us to put constraints in modeling a mechanism. 
The relevance of this question is obvious: if we can 
establish a causal (manipulative) relation between a neural 
mechanism and a specific conscious experience we could 
finally explain consciousness. Unfortunately, things are not 
so easy. In the next section I review the philosophical 
literature on intentionalism and show that intervention on 
brain mechanism only elicits a change in the intentional 
content.   
Manipulating the Intentional Content 
In the definition given above, Chalmers (2000) made 
explicit reference to the representational (or “intentional”) 
character of consciousness. As we know, intentionalism is 
the thesis according to which conscious experience has an 
intentional (i.e. representational) character. However, few, if 
any, philosophers contend that representing things to be 
thus-and-so exhausts what there is to say about 
consciousness. 
We commonly distinguish different philosophical groups 
regarding the relation between intentionality and 
consciousness (Chalmers 2004; Fish 2010; Staudacher 
2011). Here I adopt William Fish’s (2010) taxonomy, and 
identify three forms of intentionalism: strong 
phenomenology-first, strong content-first, and weak 
intentionalism. According to the first and third group 
conscious intentional content has phenomenal properties, 
whilst the second group maintains a reductive stance 
towards phenomenal properties. I will examine them in this 
order: the third, the first, and finally the second group. As I 
declared in the outset, the reader should bear in mind that I 
only focus on visual experiences.   
Weak Intentionalism 
According to weak intentionalism, phenomenal 
experiences always have intentional content (Chalmers 
2004; Peacocke 1983; Searle 1983). However, weak 
intentionalism allows that two distinct phenomenal 
experiences may have the same intentional content. 
Consider Block’s argument (1993). Suppose that you are 
travelling through a dark tunnel and you see a brightly lit 
scene at its end. According to Block, there would be a 
phenomenal difference if you keep both eyes open or you 
close one of them, even though the intentional content 
remains the same. Conscious experience, according to weak 
intentionalism, is partially independent from the intentional 
content. This poses two problems for the manipulationist 
approach. 
First, it is likely that the approach I have argued for does 
not actually target phenomenal properties. There is no 
compelling reason for thinking that manipulation of the 
neural mechanism should change conscious experience. 
Indeed, it is plausible to imagine the following scenario: a 
manipulation of the mechanism that does not produce a 
change in consciousness, but only in intentional content. 
Manipulating the neural mechanisms underlying the 
contents of visual consciousness therefore does not help us 
explaining why that content is conscious.  
The second problem concerns the surjective relation 
between intentional and phenomenal properties. We 
individuate the contents of consciousness precisely in virtue 
of their being conscious. But since two different experiences 
might have the same intentional content, we are left with the 
difficult task of explaining why and how this is possible.  
Strong Phenomenology-First Intentionalism 
A way to sidestep the latter problem is to hold that every 
variation in phenomenal character is mirrored by a variation 
in intentional content. Byrne argues that:  
 
For any two possible experiences e and e*, if they differ 
in phenomenal character, then they differ in [intentional] 
content. (Byrne 2001: 217).  
 
This is what Fish (2010) calls “strong phenomenology-
first intentionalism”. However, it should be clear that even 
this option does not solve the problem posed by weak 
intentionalism, since phenomenal properties are not 
identical with intentional properties.   
Strong Content-First Intentionalism  
Another option is to deny the existence of any 
phenomenal property, or simply to show that they can be 
reduced to some functional requirement or additional 
process. Strong content-first intentionalists espouse 
precisely this thesis. However, philosophers disagree about 
the nature of such additional requirements.  
Higher order theories of consciousness (HOT) claim that 
a first-order intentional state is conscious only when it is 
object of a higher order state. The character of such higher 
order state is disputed. Lycan (1996) contends that the 
higher order state is a kind of internal scanner akin to a 
perceptual state, whilst Rosenthal (1990) claims that the 
higher order state is a belief, or thought.  
According to HOTs, the manipulationist-mechanist 
approach does not suffice to explain consciousness. In 
addition to mechanisms for the visual contents of 
consciousness, we should also postulate the existence of 
other higher-order mechanisms whose overall function is 
necessary to make the first order state conscious. 
Furthermore, HOTs may lead to some empirical problems. 
For example, one would have to disentangle first-order from 
higher-order mechanisms, since they presumably co-activate 
when a subject is consciously visually aware of a specific 
content.  
There is still another viable option. Some philosophers 
maintain that first-order intentional states suffice for 
consciousness if they have the right sort of content, and 
when it plays some functional role (Dretske 1995; Tye 
1995). Michael Tye ‘s PANIC theory is a paradigmatic 
example:  
 
Phenomenal content, I maintain, is content that is 
appropriately poised for use by the cognitive system, 
content that is abstract and nonconceptual (Tye 1995: 137). 
   
Specifically, the intentional content must be abstract and 
nonconceptual, and it must be functionally poised, i.e. must 
be available for other cognitive processes. (Hence the 
acronym: Poised Abstract Non-Conceptual Intentional 
Content). Can the manipulationist-mechanistic approach 
explain the contents of consciousness according to Tye’s 
PANIC theory?  
The answer should be a clear “no”. The fact is that, again, 
intentional content alone does not suffice for consciousness. 
Tye’s theory shows that in order to be conscious an 
intentional content must not only have some specific 
features – i.e. being abstract, and nonconceptual – but that it 
must also be functionally poised. This seems to imply that 
there is some additional functional requirement that can 
possibly be accounted for through additional mechanisms. 
Intentional Mechanisms 
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the 
manipulationist-mechanistic approach does not explain 
consciousness. However, it is entirely plausible to contend 
that the neural machinery can alter the intentional contents 
of consciousness. Indeed, there is no principal conceptual 
problem in linking functional and structural aspects of 
consciousness to the underlying brain mechanisms. The 
picture I am describing is perfectly compatible with the hard 
problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1996). Notice that this 
conclusion is convergent with recent debates on the nature 
of the NCCs (Bayne 2007; Howhy 2009; Searle 2004). 
Significantly, combining insights provided by the 
neurosciences and philosophy, I think that the framework 
that I have sketched out paves the way to some fruitful 
perspectives on the search for the NCCs. 
If the mechanistic-manipulationist framework for content-
NCC does not explain consciousness, nonetheless it can 
rightly be conceptualized as the search for visual intentional 
mechanisms. Following Bechtel’s definition of mechanism 
(see §2), an intentional mechanism could be defined as:  
 
A structure performing the proper function of fixing the 
visual intentional content in virtue of its component parts, 
component operations, and their organization. The 
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for 
the intentional content of vision.  
Prerequisite Mechanisms and Matching Content 
Doctrine 
Prerequisites of Consciousness. What is the relation 
between intentional mechanisms and consciousness? Even if 
intentional mechanisms do not account for conscious 
experience, they can be regarded as neural prerequisite for it 
(De Graaf et al. 2012). A neural prerequisite for 
consciousness is a neural system – in our case, a neural 
mechanism – whose function is required by other neural 
mechanisms directly related to consciousness. Once the 
intentional content has been processed by an intentional 
mechanism, it can then become conscious thanks to some 
further neural processing.  
To see why, it is sufficient to reflect about intentionalism, 
which, as we have seen, is the thesis according to which 
consciousness has an intentional character. If consciousness 
– or at least visual consciousness – has an intentional 
content, it is entirely plausible to conceive the function of 
intentional mechanisms as a necessary prerequisite for 
conscious visual experience. One way to reject this 
conclusion is to reject intentionalism altogether, and simply 
deny that consciousness has any intentional content, or to 
(ideally, at least) disjoint conscious experience from any 
content1.  
Since intentional mechanisms are not directed at 
consciousness at all, the manipulationist view only fills in 
the causal gap between intentional content and brain 
mechanisms. Consequently, there still is a correlative 
relation between conscious experience and the underlying 
mechanism (see §2). It is obvious that understanding the 
                                                            
1 Although I pass this problem in silence here, the very idea of 
being conscious without being conscious of something strikes me 
as utterly mysterious, if not preposterous (see also Hohwy 2009).  
relation between phenomenal and intentional character still 
preserve its priority over the explanatory problem.   
 
Revising the Matching Content Doctrine. An interesting 
aspect of standard content-NCC research is that the contents 
of consciousness should match, or correspond, to the neural 
content (Chalmers 2000: 35). The “matching content 
doctrine” (MCD) serves as a methodological guide to the 
search for content-NCC, and is expressed within the very 
idea of a correlation. Roughly stated, the idea is this: if a 
conscious content is “matched” by a specific neural 
population in a statistically significant number of cases, they 
are probably correlated. So far, criticism of the MCD has 
mainly been motivated on the basis of a phenomenological 
objection against the contents of consciousness (e.g. Noë & 
Thompson 2004; Neisser 2012). In this study, I merely 
observe that the intentional mechanisms standpoint 
conceptualizes the MCD as a function-to-mechanism 
relation. In other words: from a given content of 
consciousness (the function), one can (tentatively) infer the 
existence of a mechanism that produces it and test this 
hypothesis through empirical techniques. 
 
Spandrels of Vision? 
Before I conclude, I would like to mention a conceptual 
problem that follows from the final considerations on the 
MCD. Rigorous phenomenological descriptions might serve 
both the initial task of decomposing a mechanism (Bechtel 
& Richardson 1993; Darden 2006; Kauffman 1971) – thus 
leading us to look for a mechanism responsible for a 
specific kind of content – and the observation of the 
conscious percept elicited by NIBS techniques, which might 
help us refining and understanding the results.  
Yet, not every single feature of our conscious visual field 
needs to have a specific functionally related mechanism. For 
example, it seems plausible to me that some features of our 
visual phenomenology might actually turn out to be 
spandrels (Gould & Lewontin 1979), rather than direct 
products of a single intentional mechanism. This latter 
aspect, I think, should urge us to adopt an evolutionary 
perspective regarding the contents of visual consciousness. 
For reasons of space, I cannot elaborate on this suggestion 
here. However, I believe that the framework developed here 
offers us yet another reason, to think the mind-brain relation 
in evolutionary terms.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, I hope to have persuasively argued for a 
reconceptualization of the content-NCC problem. Recent 
work on NIBS techniques seems to support the 
manipulationist standpoint on the content-NCC problem. 
Although what I called “intentional mechanisms” cannot 
explain consciousness, they can clearly help us in the quest 
of finding out how the brain generates the intentional 
structure of our conscious experience.  
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